Since the 18th National Congress of the Party, the Party Central Committee has demonstrated unprecedented courage and determination in consistently enforcing strict discipline, rectifying conduct, and combating corruption. It has put an end to long-standing unhealthy practices that had long resisted correction, tackled persistent and deeply entrenched problems that had remained unresolved for years, and addressed many pressing issues strongly reported by the public. As a result, the Party’s and government’s conduct have been completely revitalized, generating powerful positive energy that propels the development of the Party and the country. This year, the entire Party has carried out solid and thorough study and education on the spirit of the Central Committee’s Eight-Point Regulation. The vast majority of Party members and cadres have undergone a comprehensive and profound cleansing of their conduct—one that has probed deep into their souls, reinforced their foundations, and strengthened their resolve. Significant progress has been made in comprehensively promoting learning, inspection, and rectification; genuinely confronting and addressing the prominent problems associated with the “Four Winds”; filling gaps in the system for conduct-building; and enhancing the enforceability of existing regulations. As a result, the Party’s conduct has achieved an overall improvement.

However, we must also soberly recognize that the “Four Winds” problem—though its symptoms may have subsided, its roots remain deeply entrenched and its breeding ground still exists. Some of these problems have even reemerged under new guises. In particular, formalism and bureaucratism are like psoriasis: deeply rooted, highly mutable, and prone to relapse, making them a stubborn and persistent source of malpractice in work style. For instance, when implementing the Party Central Committee’s decisions and deployments, some practices have become superficial and merely cosmetic—some resort to slogan-driven communication, reliance on meetings and paperwork, thus creating a vicious cycle of “documents—meetings—more documents” that fail to address actual issues. Others engage in formalistic theoretical study—repeating ideas mechanically or conducting inefficient discussions without truly delving into profound comprehension, enhancing capabilities, or tackling real problems. Similarly, some Party members and cadres engage in “talking the talk but not doing the walk,” conducting surveys from their offices and “planning” reforms while avoiding genuine issues and failing to conduct thorough research. Still others prioritize departmental or short-term interests, turning a blind eye to or shirking responsibility for matters that affect the people’s long-term interests and well-being. Moreover, certain departments and localities see an invisible escalation in the number of documents and meetings, with endless circulars, electronic notices, and ad hoc gatherings becoming increasingly frequent, thereby overextending already limited grassroots resources. Furthermore, some supervisory and assessment efforts pile on ever more stringent requirements, with “one-vote veto” rules being applied indiscriminately. Others fabricate figures, embellish exemplary cases, and put on a show of superficial achievements—producing flashy rhetoric and loud pronouncements while engaging in pseudo-innovation characterized by “wordplay, highlight-seeking, and bonsai-like gimmicks.”

The chronic maladies of work style are like a slow-moving toxic haze, poisoning the very body of the Party organization and undermining both its image and its cause. The harm they inflict can be summarized in the following key aspects: First, they waste political resources and place an undue burden on the grassroots level. A vast amount of human, material, and financial resources—resources that should be devoted to serving the people and promoting development—are squandered in empty bureaucratic routines. Party members and cadres are forced to devote precious time and energy to tasks such as preparing for inspections, filling out forms, and maintaining records, easily leaving the grassroots overwhelmed and constantly scrambling to keep up. Second, they weaken the effectiveness of institutional mechanisms and hinder the pace of development. When policy measures are diluted into mere “paper targets” designed merely to tick boxes, the real problems encountered in development cannot be effectively addressed. The vigor of reform and innovation is stifled, new tasks and demands go unmet, and thus the momentum of development is stalled. Third, they erode the Party’s healthy vitality and shake the foundations among the masses. If the passionate, hands-on scenes of serving the people are replaced by cold, impersonal forms and hollow, empty meetings, the credibility of both the Party and the government will inevitably suffer. This will dilute the trust and affection of the people, sever the bond between the Party and the masses, and quietly create hidden vulnerabilities in the Party’s governing foundation.

Why do persistent maladies such as formalism and bureaucratic practices keep recurring despite repeated efforts to eradicate them? The root cause lies in “pathological conditions” that have emerged in areas including ideological foundations, organizational culture, value orientations, and governance mechanisms.

Impure Party spirit is the root cause of formalism and bureaucracy. General Secretary Xi Jinping emphasized that issues of work style are fundamentally issues of Party spirit, and at the heart of these issues lies the relationship between the Party and the masses. When Party spirit is impure, the Party will deviate from its original purpose, leading to distortions and perverted views on political achievements and the exercise of power—resulting in a failure to genuinely put the interests of the people first and instead treating the power entrusted to them by the Party and the people as personal privilege. Some Party members and cadres see themselves as masters over the masses, regarding organs tasked with serving the people as mere officialdom, and outwardly adopting the comportment of "official overlords" in their actions. Others either ignore the expectations of the masses or dare not address their legitimate demands, refusing to engage in, being unwilling to engage in, or simply lacking the ability to carry out mass work, thus finding themselves utterly mute before the people. It can be said that the strength of Party spirit determines the authenticity of one’s work style. If we fail to firmly uphold our fundamental stance and regularly "replenish calcium and strengthen bones," issues of work style that deviate from the people’s interests will inevitably recur.

The practice of prioritizing conformity to superiors over factual reality has led to policies that fail to resonate with the actual conditions on the ground. Some Party members and cadres are accountable only to directives from their superiors, but not to the changing, complex realities on the ground. They fail to conduct thorough investigations or analyze specific issues in a concrete, case-by-case manner; instead, they simply execute policies mechanically. This disconnects the original intent of the policies from the actual conditions at the grassroots level, causing work to lose sight of its goal of promoting development. For example, some localities, disregarding their own resource endowments and market demands, blindly copy industrial models promoted by higher authorities. As a result, after these projects are launched, production capacities remain idle, leaving local residents with little hope of increasing their incomes. In other cases, local authorities adopt a “one-size-fits-all” approach to enterprise policies, failing to take into account the real difficulties enterprises face during their transformation and offering no reasonable transition plans. Such practices not only undermine market vitality but also harm employment opportunities for local residents. This rigid, one-sided, and uncritical copying—where “top and bottom are uniformly identical”—essentially turns policy implementation into a mere “megaphone”: when the top issues a directive, the bottom simply parrots it back; when the top draws up a blueprint, the bottom just copies it slavishly. Over time, this practice not only distorts well-intentioned policies as they’re implemented, reducing them to empty shells that look good on paper but lack practical effectiveness; it also causes us to miss the best opportunities for addressing real problems. Even the most pragmatic individuals end up marginalized. Eventually, this leads to the formation of a “spiral of silence”—where people dare not speak the truth, dare not report the real situation, dare not conduct in-depth research, dare not try out new ideas. Small matters are allowed to fester, and easy tasks become increasingly difficult. By prioritizing obedience to superiors over reality, this approach further exacerbates the bureaucratic habit among some leading cadres of treating their decisions as beyond question, undermining the flexibility of policy adjustment mechanisms. The ultimate outcome is an officialdom that has lost touch with the masses, a lethargy that delays development, and a moribund atmosphere that covers up underlying contradictions.

Lack of ability, so we resort to formalities. At present, China finds itself in a complex and ever-changing domestic and international environment. Faced with this new situation, some Party members and cadres still lack sufficient political competence, awareness of struggle, and practical skills to engage in struggle effectively. Their capacity to promote development and govern is still inadequate, leading to both the problem of “being unable to keep pace” and the phenomenon of “not wanting to keep pace.” As a result, a formalistic style has emerged—simply going through the motions and paying lip service—using ostentatious meetings, documents, and forms to mask real shortcomings such as weak capabilities, superficial work, and a lack of accountability. For instance, in response to new governance demands under the conditions of digitalization, some Party members and cadres fail to proactively acquire new knowledge and skills; instead, they blindly follow trends by rushing into building government apps and data dashboards. In the end, these technological tools are distorted into “form-filling systems 2.0,” becoming mere formalism at our fingertips. In some localities, targets for filling out government apps are imposed on grassroots levels, forcing certain townships (and subdistricts) under immense pressure to resort to fabricating and submitting false information. Another example: in an online environment that has become unprecedentedly complex, any innovative approach could easily become a public hotspot, subject to intense public scrutiny and enormous media pressure. Consequently, some Party members and cadres, driven by a desire for stability, dare not take responsibility and are reluctant to innovate. They reduce exploratory pilot projects to “bonsai-like endeavors” that can be photographed and quantified. Once this practice of using “empty displays” to satisfy higher-level inspections and meet public demands proves successful time after time, it further reinforces the perception and preference for “form over substance.”

Assessment and supervision have degenerated into bureaucracy, giving rise to formalism. With the widespread adoption of assessment and supervision methods such as lists of responsibilities and performance evaluations, the supervisory and evaluative powers of higher-level authorities have been further strengthened, which helps ensure that the Party’s guidelines, policies, and decision-making arrangements are better implemented. However, there has also emerged a phenomenon in some departments where officials adopt an aloof, unrealistic attitude, issuing arbitrary directives, focusing excessively on inspections and acceptance checks, rushing to oversee tasks, and conducting haphazard evaluations. For example, in some localities, in order to prepare for assessments, several versions of responsibility lists are issued to townships (subdistricts) within just one week—resulting in grassroots units having no choice but to outsource the completion of these forms and submit them in bulk. Moreover, certain higher-level authorities tend to micromanage, exercising overly strict control over even the minutest details. In reality, they rely on accountability agreements and “sticks and carrots” to pass responsibility down to the grassroots level, leading to an ever-expanding scope of accountability at the lower levels. Some grassroots cadres, seeking to avoid or shift responsibility, become adept at engaging in elaborate formalities and competitively “create traces” and “beautify” their records, thus giving rise to a universal coping strategy characterized by “a thousand knives from above, yet only one form below.” This bureaucratic management coupled with formalistic responses creates a vicious cycle.

Addressing deep-rooted problems in work style is a systematic undertaking that requires both addressing the symptoms and tackling the root causes with targeted, precise measures. First, we must strengthen ideological development. By establishing a targeted Party-cultivation education system and introducing a regular “health check-up” mechanism for Party spirit, we can help Party members and cadres correct deviations at the ideological level and thus ward off the “virus” of unhealthy practices. Second, we need to improve policies and institutional frameworks. When formulating policies, higher-level authorities should fully take into account the actual conditions and capacity of grassroots units, ensuring that the resulting systems and policies are practical, effective, and truly implementable. These policies should be easy to understand and simple to put into practice at the grassroots level, thereby preventing frequent adjustments and sudden changes. At the same time, policy implementation should allow room for discretionary judgment, enabling grassroots units to tailor policies to their specific circumstances and implement them flexibly and effectively, thus avoiding arbitrary directives and one-size-fits-all approaches. Third, we must optimize the evaluation and assessment system. We should reduce the number of assessment items, rectify practices such as requiring multiple layers of report submissions and demanding extensive documentation, significantly consolidate and streamline inspections and assessments targeting grassroots units, and thereby lighten the burden on grassroots staff who are constantly preparing for evaluations. We should also refine assessment indicators by merging and integrating common indicators from multi-departmental and multi-line inspections and assessments, and eliminating those indicators that are redundant, lack specificity, or fail to highlight key priorities. Moreover, we should strengthen positive incentives, emphasizing the role of “positive lists” in assessments and leveraging assessments as a mechanism for positive motivation. Fourth, we must continue to relieve burdens and empower grassroots units. On the one hand, we must strictly enforce the "Several Provisions on Rectifying Formalism and Reducing Burdens on Grassroots Units," genuinely driving efforts to address the root causes of burdens on grassroots levels, freeing cadres from the heavy load of bureaucratic red tape and allowing them to devote more energy to implementing policies and serving the people. On the other hand, we must trust grassroots units and cadres, improve mechanisms for tolerating mistakes, and foster a grassroots political environment that encourages taking responsibility and promotes innovation—so that Party members and cadres can pursue their work and entrepreneurship without any lingering concerns.